An AI agent reads mail, updates records, calls tools, alters data. The dangerous one is the agent nobody registered. It inherited permissions from a prototype, kept them in production, and no one reviewed what it could actually reach.
What we observe
Agent-centric platforms are granted identities and tool access so they can automate work. The perimeter around that grant is often thin: an agent with broad tool access, accumulating memory, and approval flows that treat it as trusted. A prompt injection or a compromised tool call then steers an identity with real authority.
Why it matters now
The EU AI Act and OWASP's agentic guidance now treat this as a first-class surface. A delegated authority that can alter data, approve a payment, or exfiltrate records turns a model weakness into an operational consequence - not a governance slide but an attack path.
How to defend
Inventory every agent, its identity, and the tools and data it can reach. Enforce least privilege on agent authority. Test adversarially: prompt injection, tool abuse, and whether an agent can misuse delegated identity or approval workflows. Governance matters less than what the agent can do.
Why this matters in the UAE
UAE organisations are adopting AI at speed - the National Cyber Security Strategy (2025-2031) and the Emirates' AI agenda push agentic automation into financial and government services. That same speed multiplies shadow-agent exposure: each deployed agent inherits real identity and reach, often before security has inventoried it. Aligning agentic rollout with CBUAE technology-risk expectations and the national strategy means testing what agents can actually do, not just what was configured.
The Exploit Labs takeaway: test the agent's authority, not only its prompt.
Exploit Labs works with UAE enterprises to put agent identity to the test - from Dubai's financial district to federal and semi-government platforms.
Get in touch today and we will see, how we can help you secure your projects.
Johannes Schoenborn
